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The emerging clan capitalism in the world* 
  
In the present article a number of critical economics situations are discussed based on clan 
capitalism as starting point. One can see clearly then, that instead of assuming 'ordinary 
economy’ and clan/crony capitalism is an exception in particular nation because of certain 
socio-historical context, one should begin with the opposite assumption instead: that clan 
capitalism can be found almost everywhere in this planet. 
 
Introduction 
Many economists think that economy of any particular nation is something more or less 
like building a house: in that sense if all people work to maximize their utility (cf. Adam 
Smith) then eventually the house will be built properly, especially if market mechanism is 
allowed to function properly without too much government intervention. But nowhere in 
this world, this simple perceived assumption works. Mostly, either excessive market 
liberalization advocated by laissez-faire and neo-liberalism proponents gives worst result 
(crises) or government intervention is too heavy, and then there is no incentive for 
enterprises to innovate and create new products and services. 
Based on a number of previous study, (cf. Yoshihara Kunio and Mancur Olson), then we 
submit another approach, that is: instead of assuming 'ordinary economy’ and clan/crony 
capitalism is an exception in particular nation because of certain socio-historical context, 
one should begin with the opposite assumption instead: that clan capitalism can be found 
almost everywhere in this planet (not only in Russia, latin America, or Japan), and if in a 
few nations there are normal/ordinary economy where all group of functions work well, 
that is only an exception. West Europe apparently perform quite good compared to other 
regions in the world in this respect, but one should be aware because as globalization takes 
full effect in the coming years, then just like a virus can spread all over the world, similarly 
clan capitalism can be transported and transformed on board to other countries. Excessive 
financial liberalization and integration can introduce further vehicle which can be used by 
those clan groups to take advantages.  
 
__________________ 
*written by V. Christianto, email: VictorChristianto@gmail.com  
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Kunio [12] have conducted studies on south east asia, while Mancur Olson[18] based his 
study on Russia economy in 80-90s. But then we know that similar situation can be 
extended to either USA or Japan economy,[1][6] i.e. that clan capitalism or ersatz capitalism 
can be found in all national economies both in developing countries and developed 
countries alike. The old phrase that 'money is the root of all evil' can be extended to 
become 'the root of all evil is money, power and clan.' To put emphasis on this framework, 
we should say that there is no such thing as a perfect building or house, because each house 
imposes particular defect or imperfection, just like in Le Corbusier's imperfection 
architectural style in the past decades.[17] The question then is to start with such defects 
as norm, and then work based on that situation.  
We hope that this article can be considered as starting point for imperfect economy study 
(not only asymmetric information), based on starting hypothesis that there is no such thing 
as 'normal economy.' All economy is influenced by a number of clan groups and also 
numerous sub-groups which join to those clans’ back wagon, and those create an ersatz-
capitalism infected economy. 
 Quoted from a recent article: "This echoes some other crony capitalism contexts - Russia 
comes to mind - but differs from others, such as many cases in Latin America, and is 
unusual in a country with as much recent political stability as America."[1] That is what is 
supposed to happen in US. 
 
What does happen in russia? 
There are a number of viewpoint arguments have been pointed out to explain problems in 
Russia economy, i.e. neoliberalism, (neo-)keynesian, and clan capitalism argument.  Of 
course, the neoliberalism proponents would argue that liberalism advises have never been 
put into practice, as quoted from an article: "In short, the neo-liberals explain the collapse 
of the Russian economy in terms of the perverse incentives provided by the policies and 
practices of the Russian government: failure, corruption and criminality is rewarded, while 
legitimate business activity is penalized. The collapse of production and investment is the 
result of the absence of the ‘order and good government’ that is the necessary foundation of 
liberal capitalism."[2] And the keynesian proponent will argue that excessive liberalization 
and privatization has been put into effect in the past decade without sufficient preparation 
and transition, which then make the situation even worse.  
The third argument, that is by clan capitalism proponent, would say that clan groups 
always take place amidst the transition process and their activities include sabotaging 
numerous amount of development fund from external sources for their own clan groups. At 
the end of the transition process, then the economy takes the form of strengthened and 
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consolidated clan capitalism, where excessive power is obtained by a few number of clan 
groups only, while leaving the rest of the public remain in suffering condition. A short 
description is given as follows:  
"Under crony capitalism selected economic elites receive preferential treatment and 
privileges, thus making support from the state rather than market forces a crucial 
factor for maintaining and accruing wealth."[3]  
Then one need to define what is clan capitalism. A useful term is suggested by Kosals[4], 
that is clan capitalism, which possibility to become worsening further and become oligarch 
capitalism [4, p.8]. The purpose of clan is as described as follows:  
"First of all, such clan isn’t a group of relatives but it is business entity with for profit 
activity...The general strategic purpose of the clan is to accumulate the resources 
and to expand its power and influence in the field of operation. Every clan intends to 
reach a stable position and to control external environment, to create favor external 
socioeconomic and political conditions. Many clans desire to become a monopoly to 
protect internal operation." [4, p.11]  
According to Kosals, elements of the clan include [4]: 
a. chieftain: that is charismatic leader which control all operations of the clan;  
b. the core: key persons which are closest collaborators of the chieftain. 
c. skilled professionals: that is specialists who are hired with high salary.  
d. ordinary members: those are specialists and manual workers employed in business 
entities. 
e. agents of influence: people outside it but serving it because of their unique positions in 
the media, law enforcement agencies etc. 
Quoted from Kosals: "the most powerful clans are in industries dealing with extraction, 
processing and export of natural resources (oil, gas, metals); FSB; financing; military; law 
enforcement agencies; defense industries." [4, p.20] Other quote: "The biggest clans at 
every level headed by so called oligarchs. There are around one - two hundreds of oligarchs 
at every level, therefore, obviously, near one thousand oligarchs are operating in Russia 
totally" [4, 23] 
The situation apparently do not happen only in Russia, but also in Latin America. Quoted 
from Kosals: "Cronyism is one of the specific features of clan capitalism. It was examined in 
detail within analysis of the specific model of capitalism developing in Latin America crony 
capitalism." [4, 27] 
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That is why, one need to take a look further on the impact of clan capitalism and its 
respective negative impact to overall economy of a given country. One should begin that 
clan capitalism which is inevitably infectious but already epidemic in numerous states, 
either in the form of shadow economy, crony capitalism, ersatz capitalism, clan capitalism, 
or even oligarch economy. One can even hypothesize that actually clan capitalism is more 
than exception as often assumed; it is market economy governed by small business entities 
which is an exception. There is no such thing as free market economy, as all economies are 
cronies-infected.  
Clan capitalism is a chronic disease, but the fact is that all economies suffer from more or 
less the same chronic disease. See Appendix I for responses to a questionnaire.  
 
Japan economy, boryokudan, and botaiho 
While it has been neglected in standard economics textbooks, clandestine groups such as 
yakuza can affect up to 40% of Japan economy problems.  Quote: "The emergence of Jusen 
companies, which had strong links with Japanese mafia, otherwise known as Yakuza, 
proved to be one of the major hurdles in the Japanese banking reforms. The Jusen problem 
exposed the nexus between banks, Ministry of Finance and yakuza. ...Later, it was also 
revealed that some officials in the Ministry of Finance had strong links with yakuza." [5, 
p.3]  
While one can think otherwise that such a yakuza(boryokudan)-related issues are 
diminishing, it has been concluded that: "The yakuza plays an important role in the 
Japanese financial system even today, thanks to the involvement of banks in the real-estate 
sector during the bubble period. These problems continued to haunt the Japanese banking 
sector and some believe that it was more of a socio-cultural problem than purely an 
economic one..." [5, p.5] 
Unlike in Russia Federation, where clans are mostly organized around their chieftains, 
yakuza organizations are apparently more stable, with three big syndicates, i.e. yamaguchi-
gumi, inagawa-kai, and sumiyoshi-kai [6, p.1]. Quite related to the problems emerge which 
are caused by such clandestine organizations including yakuza, there are concerns raised 
recently pertaining to possibility of Japan economy to experience similar crisis compared 
to what happen in Greece in the beginning and the first quarter of 2010. However, there is 
significant difference here, that is that Greece economy problem is not yakuza or clan 
related, while one great obstacle to reform Japan industrial sectors and also financial 
sectors alike were their relationship with yakuza and other clandestine groups, which have 
been tolerated since Showa era.[6] 
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Then with regards to question whether one should do or not do economics reformation, 
one can also refer to another recent suggestion by Posen (2009) that "but if you take a 
broader historical perspective, that essentially hesitation to finally fix the banks is what 
kept Japan from doing the right thing, in a sense, throughout the 1990s." 
 
Lesson to learn: how to take proper measure on clan capitalism 
And with regards to spectrum of choices available to policy makers, one first shall bear in 
mind that the clan capitalism are already there for quite some time, and that includes 
possibly a number of politician, and senate member, and other party alike, including a 
number of high-profile elites known as ‘oligarch’, which mean that it would take more than 
one sweep to clean up all the mess. Therefore, apparently there are only a limited number 
of possible approaches in order to take proper measure on those clan capitalists, such as: 
 
a. anti-clan regulation: in Japan there was passage of anti-yakuza regulation which restrict 
their actions (botaiho), while at the same time give time for them to 'evolve' to put their 
feet on other kind of transactions.[6] In other countries too, such an anti-clan regulation 
can be put into effect, not only anti-drugdealing or anti-humantrafficking. In the case of 
Japan, the situation after passage of botaiho indicate decreasing attractiveness of joining 
clan group: "young males are ceasing to find gang membership an attractive career choice." 
[6,p.11]      
 
b. very strict measures: just as what China do to all alleged problematic politicians or 
governors. But if too many clan-related politicians are involved in law enforcement 
agencies, and then perhaps this method may not be practically viable. See Figure 1 for 
illustration. 
 
c. clean up the government offices first: this can be effective if one can estimate how many 
number of politician in government body and also in regional offices which are involved or 
participate in the predominating clans, then removing all of those clan-related officers can 
be a good choice. However, such a policy may not be viable in other countries, perhaps 
Russia, where state-clan relationship are quite neat and where it is not so easy to imagine 
that government officers can function without those chieftains entity. Military involvement 
in a number of clan-groups can make matters more difficult. 
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d. breaking the chains: one possible countermeasure of the clan's improper involvement in 
policy making is to identify the clandestine people which are not exactly part of the clans, 
but they play the role of intermediaries among clandestine groups and government 
officials. For instance, if one think that there are a few huge clans which can affect US 
national economy and those are oil-industrial-military complex clans, then perhaps one 
should track down to d. rockefeller and zbigniew brzezinski if one wish to break their 
chains. For other example of oil-military industry clan group, see Carlyle group as 
discussed in Goodman & Goodman[11]. One can think that it is not unlikely that those clan 
groups can affect also news media and academic institutions (see diagram 2).  
 
e. network analysis: one of recent tool to analyze gang's network is using network analysis. 
This method has been advanced by a number of theoretician, but in principle the same 
method can be used to find out how a clan is related to media, government officer, scientist, 
economist, public media, and perhaps policy influencer. Stop to think that economists 
including neoliberalist proponents are only doing their job as scientist. Of course, some 
economists are doing their job well for the wellness of a nation, but others are only profit 
maximizer, hence one good solution is to minimize their role as good policy-maker as a 
counter-measure to the clan groups’ influence to their advantage. 
 
f. autopoeisis[8] and bacteria analogy: Autopoiesis can be defined broadly as ability and 
mechanism of bacteria and other life cell to retain its life: “The main feature of autopoiesis 
is the self-maintenance due to a process of self-generation from within. Although this 
concept came from the analysis of a living cell, it can be metaphorically applied to social 
systems.”[8, p.9] One can think that bacteria rely on and make interaction with their 
environment in order to get what they need and to give supporting conditioning. Similarly, 
a mafia or clan groups take much from their environment and people surrounding them in 
order they can continue their excessive spending. For example, it has been estimated that 
Japan economy suffer from yakuza clan groups because some 40% of transaction or project 
involve them. If then we assume a moderate estimate of 3% to 5% of 'security protection' 
then the amount siphoned for their clans amount to 40% x 3% = 1.2%. Similarly, in Russia 
economy, especially in metallurgy and oil producing and other natural resources 
industries, there are significant role played by clans and oligarchs, which at a time can 
influence russia economy and private business up to 70-80% around 90s.[10] Some of 
them ask that fee with label such as security protection, but you know that sometimes such 
extra security fee takes place because there are competition among clans themselves (that 
is, a client should hire a clan for protection against violence threat exercised by another 
clan). Therefore, in order to suppress and reduce actions of those clan groups, one need to 
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understand better how the autopoiesis mechanism are used by bacteria to survive and 
grow in their environment, and then how to minimize their activities. One possible 
approach is to introduce obstacle in order those bacteria and virus will not escalate and 
move beyond their present environment. And after that, reduce and minimize their effect 
within that obstacle/barrier.     
Other problem is that a number of those clan groups are already moving abroad, that is 
they become so large group and then they decide to go global. Such a globalization of clan 
groups can be thought of as parallel with virus which becomes epidemic.[8] There is no 
such easy measure to counter this tendency, for instance considering the increasing 
transactions related to human trafficking, drug dealing etc., which sometimes those large 
clan groups got support from other clandestine groups, that is secret agencies. Some of 
those secret agencies may need large support to continue their programs abroad, and they 
think that drug dealing etc. can be their vehicle for finding those support.[11]    
 
g. counter-incentive measures: another difficult part for breaking the chains among the 
state and clan groups is to provide a proper scheme for young people in order they can stay 
away from clan groups. For instance, during a conversation with a Russia young man 
sometime ago, this writer were told that it is often a compulsory for an average high-school 
graduate young boy whose parents are not rich to be military officer, at least to serve there 
for a number of years, while other high-school graduate young boy who has rich parents is 
not required to be military officer. Then after a while, that average young boy would find 
himself to get lack of option to get normal wealthy. Perhaps this reasoning can explain why 
for some young boys/girls the only choice is to support or join a clan group in one or other 
way (for example, to become drug dealer), especially if he/she got lack training in other 
skills. That is why: being a part of clan groups (be it yakuza, or drug dealer, or other 
clandestine groups in asia) is an 'incentive' for those average young people because that 
path offers a short-cut to become wealthy in short time. One can perhaps reason that a 
proper counter-incentive scheme to reduce such a tendency to join clan group, is by 
offering support, perhaps by some kind of business start-up support to at least 10-20% of 
the brightest of those average young high-school graduates in order they can begin their 
own start-ups. Therefore, giving good incentives to new start-ups by young people is not 
only good practice for economics reason (creating new entrepreneurs), but perhaps it is 
also a good counter-measure toward joining clan groups which can devastate a nation's 
economy in the long-run.  
Along with an effective anti-clan regulation such as botaiho in Japan, then implementing 
such a counter-incentive can be an effective approach.  
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Different paths towards healthier economy 
The following figure (Figure 1) is a simplified diagram on how each nation can follow 
different paths towards the idealized model that is economy composed of business 
enterprises which are less oligopolized and all of them work to be more effective and 
efficient while creating better and useful products and services to the market. There can be 
six possibilities, i.e. ranging from equal enterprises, clan capitalism, and oligarch capitalism 
(the worst situation), in a condition of either laissez-faire or state intervention. What 
characterizes region 6 is that there should be more or less equal playing field for all equal 
enterprises, which prevent them to form oligarch formation which can make the entire 
economy less competitive. Of course such an idealized condition is difficult to achieve, 
because each large enterprise always have tendency to form oligopolistic situation.  
For example, the path experienced by Russia is not from centralized state-owned oligarch 
corporate (for instance in metallurgy industry) toward many private enterprises in a 
liberalized and laissez-faire environment (region 6), but instead from region 1 to region 4. 
That is a path to clan capitalism. And if the situation is worsening, then it can move toward 
region 2 (oligarch capitalism).  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
Figure 1. six possibilities of a nation’s economy path toward healthy economy 
 
Therefore, without strict, realistic and drastic measures to handle those clan groups, then 
they can turn the entire economy to become oligarch economy, which is unlikely to bring a 
better and healthier economy for most people in the federation.  
laissez faire & excessive liberalisation 
oligarch capitalism 
clan capitalism 
equal enterprises 
(ideal model) 
Path 1: centralized oligarch state-
corporate to become clan capitalism 
5 6 
3 4 
2 1 
Excessive state intervention  
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The situation of Japan economy is a bit more advanced, because there are no apparent clan 
groups, except those boryokudan clans and also a few major enterprises  who form 
interrelated groups called a cartel and predominate the industries.[5] Quote:” They also 
acted as cartels that led to monopolization of the Japanese industries.”[5]. It is not quite 
clear what is the present path of progress, whether that is to reach region 2, or to region 4, 
where a few number of clan groups predominating the whole economy. Nonetheless, Japan 
economy seems a bit in better situation compared to Russia because they did not 
experience long time period under state planning and state-owned corporate who control 
all production and supplies.  
 
Another thing worth to consider is to study the pattern of ‘clotting’ of those clan groups 
among other democracy and economy institutions. In this regards, one can remember 
Amartya Sen’s hypothesis sometime ago that is: that democracy can affect distribution of 
wealth in a given nation, and that bad democracy may bring unequal distribution of 
products, which make many people in a nation suffer much more. If we extend this 
hypothesis a bit further, then one can hypothesize that (i) there is always tendency for clan 
groups to influence democracy system including news/media as the fourth pillar of 
democracy, in order to alter the course of distribution of resources for their advantage. To put 
this effect, see the diagram 2 below. 
 
Diagram 2. Tendency to influence democracy institutions 
That is why we learn that it is quite common in Russia that a major clan group to own not 
only manufacture or metallurgy corporate, they also own mass media channel in order to 
serve their own needs. 
clan 
group
executive 
(govt.)
repre-
sentative 
news / 
media
judicative 
Law enforcement agencies Industrial sectors 
Financial sectors 
Natural resources 
Academic institutions 
Military force agencies 
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In summary, not only those clan groups want to control industrial sectors, financial sectors, 
and natural resources for preservation of their interests, they also want to influence 
democracy institutions including law enforcement agencies for their advantage. That is 
typical acute problem in Russia and perhaps in other countries including latin America, and 
that is exactly what makes the ordinary public suffer more. One can distinguish how such 
‘clotting’ developed among clan and democracy institutions by using analogies of 
malevolent virus or bacteria take over human body: 
a. Stadium 1: they will accumulate influence in mass media /news corporate. An anti-
oligopoly of mass media ownership such that no big clan can own more than 40% of 
total mass media can be put in effect. In USA similar regulation apparently has been 
put into effect to avoid such massive media ownership. See a bracket in diagram 3.  
 
 
Diagram 3. Tendency to influence news / media 
 
b. Stadium 2: they will accumulate influence in executive institutions, to become 
associate or senior staffs of the ruling government (clans). Such a practice 
apparently have become quite common in russia. See another bracket in diagram 4. 
 
clan 
group
executive 
(govt.)
repre-
sentative 
news / 
media
judicative 
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Diagram 4. Tendency to influence news and also executive (government officers) 
 
c. Stadium 3: they will accumulate influence among house of representative (senate), 
including but not limited to buying vote in order to put a number of their member in 
house of representative. Similar to diagram 4, but there is also bracket from clan 
groups to house of representative.  
d. Stadium 4: they will accumulate influence among judicative institutions, including if 
possible in law enforcement agencies. They will do their best attempt to block each 
new regulation which are intended to limit their clandestine activities. Pattern 
toward this attitude can be found in almost all clan groups including in developed 
countries. Similar to diagram4, but there is also bracket from clan groups to house 
of representative, and also from clan group to judicative institutions.     
e. Stadium 5: is perhaps the worst possible scenario, where a number of 
predominating clan groups already take over the entire democracy institutions 
including executive, house of representative, judicative institutions, and also they 
manage to control majority of mass media. Not only that, they also extend their 
influence to military force agencies, which mean that they are practically control a 
nation.( see diagram 2) If this situation take place, then it would be very difficult to 
reverse democracy institutions to become function normally again, because each 
effort to return back normal democracy can be blocked by those clan members in 
other institutions. Therefore government and other democracy institutions in 
clan 
group
executive 
(govt.)
repre-
sentative 
news / 
media
judicative 
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particular nation should work hard in order that the clan group viruswill not take 
over all institutions and reach stadium 5.   
Of course, the above diagram is merely a simplified sketch, and the real situation can be 
much more complicated, for example a number of clan groups can manage to control a 
number of education institutions which make them favorable in the opinion of 
academicians, and that perception can be proved to be beneficial them in the long-run 
because some of those academicians can be persuaded to follow their actions. For instance, 
if those academicians are participants of adviser group in a country, then they can make 
false suggestion and advice because of particular interests. That is example: shleifer as 
adviser to Russia transition. [15] 
Note: the above analogy of clan actions and ‘stadium’ of cancer in human, is not a new 
analogy. There is a review of book with title The cancer stage of capitalism. Quoted: “the 
host body’s immune system does not respond to the cancer’s advance, because the 
communication systems of host social bodies across the world are themselves subordinate 
to transnational capital and largely reject and refuse to disseminate messages that identify 
the source of the disease.” [16] That kind of neglecting that clan groups is part of the 
problem, not solution, can be found among students and other academicians, because they 
do not realize where the problem begin, and to some of them those clan groups are really 
powerful and look amazing, so they tend to submit to their power.  
 
There are variations of clan group interaction with external sources 
Diagram 2 above indicate possible interaction made by a number of clan groups to extend 
their influence to democracy institutions in their country. But there are situations where 
such a clan group can also influence other country’s democracy process (such as Carlyle 
group[11]), and some clan groups can also take advantage of external sources, such as 
development fund (that is what happened in Russia, and perhaps a number of Africa 
countries).  
Ordinary people may think that oil-industries have nothing to do with them, but they forget 
that sometime those large oil-industries can make effect such that the state supports their 
actions in foreign countries, and that can mean a long-period of economic stagnation 
because the state and public as a whole effectively should take the burden to finance those 
oil-industries’ foreign adventures. [11]    
Other example, during privatization process in Russia under Anatoly Chubais, A. Shleifer 
can be thought of as playing clandestine role while allowing a huge amount of sum went to 
Russia under the flag of privatization program, which in reality the sum were siphoned off 
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the Russia economy [9]. The net result is that the Russia economy is not getting better, 
even if we compare with other formerly-socialist nations.  
One can think that actually there were not privatization at all, but only a huge sum of 
foreign money which were used to boost power equity of such clans. Therefore A. Shleifer 
et al. who have also written their version of transition in their book 'Without a map' can be 
considered of such a chain or intermediaries of those clandestine clans in Russia. See for 
instance Lyndon LaRouche's report [7]. Shleifer's wife Nancy Zimmerman is a close 
associate of present minister of treasury of U.S, that is larry summers.[9] 
Furthermore, there have been allegation that shleifer and his colleagues who have to assist 
Russia in their transition, has purchase a number of stake in oil corporation, which can 
make his decisions to be influenced by a number of special interests. Quoted: “Shleifer and 
Hay, who ran Harvard's Russia project, secretly bought large personal stakes in Russian oil 
companies.”[15]   
The effect of clan groups to development fund can be tremendous, because they will make 
sure to get beneficial effects from development fund and other external sources. And they 
will use all government (executive officers) in their disposal to make a way to accomplish 
their purposes. And if there is ‘trickle-down’ effect, then such development fund will be 
trickling down only to those clan groups. Such a problem can be found not only in Russia, 
but also in other developing countries, where a number of reports say that development 
fund only make a dictator in developing country to be more powerful.  
This situation can be illustrated by diagram no.5, where there are double triangle, where a 
clan group will try to influence and gain control, i.e. military forces agencies, oil (natural 
resources), development fund, and advisers. Now you see that even economic advisers and 
development fund from external sources can be influenced and altered during the process 
in order the net effect is always beneficial for those ruling clan groups.  
We do not mention here other black market activities such as illegal import and export 
activities, which may or may not be related to clan group activities. Of course, if those 
activities in particular illegal importing or exporting of things related to drugs, then these 
activities are more likely related to clan groups. Limiting and decreasing plantation area of 
those plants which form as natural source of those illegal drugs can be effective (let say to 
decrease plantation area by 1-10 km2 per year), in this regards, but of course that would 
not be an easy task for law enforcement agencies in particular country, in particular 
because there are external market which include their own clans who are interested in 
those plants, and they already form connection with legal or illegal military forces (see 
diagram 5). That is why, one necessary step is to detach tentacles of those clans in 
government and military offices.       
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Diagram 5. Tendency to influence military, oil, adviser, and development fund 
 
 Is there advantage for excessive liberalization? 
Unlike the common view based on neo-liberalism ideology, one should realize that going to 
excessive liberalization (region 6) is very unlikely to bring a healthier economy, especially 
when there are influential clan and oligarch groups, because they are likely to form better 
situation for their own advantage, and that is why there is strong tendency to prevent other 
private enterprises to grow and to be mature. At the end the result will be more or less like 
oligopoly situation in almost all industries, which real effect is likely to turn the entire 
economy to be less competitive, and domestic effect can be as far as scarcity of products 
and bad distribution because those clan and oligarch groups enjoy monopoly or oligopoly 
systems where there is lack of competitors.   
Furthermore, from history one can learn a good principle, that is: excessive liberalization is 
often a precursor of financial crises. The example can be given here, that is knickerbocker 
trust collapse in 1907 was a signal of a crises. And you should know that in that period, 
there are numerous trust which work as investment units but they are not banks, and there 
were lack of regulation for them. Similarly there are investment units with lack of 
regulation in 2007-2008 which then lead to financial turmoil. For simplicity, we include 
here a table (Table 1) to summarize some disadvantages related to excessive liberalization 
in a particular country, from the viewpoint of clan capitalism. Note that these results are 
clan 
group
executive 
(govt.)
repre-
sentative 
news / 
media
judicative 
development 
fund 
economic 
adviser 
oil resources military forces 
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often very different compared to benefits of excessive liberalism which neo-liberalism 
proponents often advertise and promote as receipt. 
 
Table 1. Disadvantages of excessive liberalization from the viewpoint of clan capitalism 
Disadvantage of excessive liberalization Description 
Oligopoly risk There is tendency that clan groups will form 
oligopoly if there is not anti-trust or anti-
clan law enacted. 
Clan groups will pay incentive to their 
clan associate in democracy institutions 
There is tendency that those clan groups or 
their oligopolistic association are more 
willing to pay more to their ‘associates’ in 
democracy institutions included law 
enforcement agencies in order they can 
continue their clandestine operations. Such 
practice is often found in a number of 
countries. This practice cannot be stopped 
without introducing special regulation.   
Clan groups pay less tax rate There is tendency that such oligopoly 
associations and clan groups expect a sort of 
benefits from influencing democracy 
institutions, especially tax collecting agents 
and law enforcement agencies, that is 
benefits in the form of lower tax rates, 
compared to what they actually ought to 
pay. Member of those clan groups expect 
that discounted tax rate as their benefit. 
Reduce benefits for common people In practice, excessive liberalization would 
mean less regulation, but that often would 
mean benefit only for larger clan groups. 
And common people will receive less 
benefit, especially because large clan groups 
will affect both market and democracy 
institutions alike to their advantages.      
Hidden opportunity cost Clan groups often play their role as middle-
men and intermediaries who stay in the 
middle of a number of transactions type, 
including negotiation of certain projects, 
those practices can be found in number of 
countries including Japan, for example. In 
other word, both the buyer (user of a 
particular service) and the seller will pay 
more for those clan’s services. That cost 
would imply a hidden opportunity cost. 
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Other type of hidden opportunity cost is that 
those intermediaries often make a sale of 
piece of land or particular product become 
much higher more than necessary. Without 
specific regulation (such as botaiho), that 
kind of practice cannot be stopped. 
Precursor of financial crises It is found that excessive liberalization is 
often a precursor of financial crises (see 
McKinnon for instance). Liberalization here 
also includes allowing excessive noise 
trading without any restriction whatsoever. 
Excessive liberalization often gives more 
advantage for clan groups to do trading with 
external clan without restrictions, including 
drug dealing and human-trafficking. Other 
restriction in terms of taxing of 
international foreign exchange market have 
been discussed elsewhere (Tobin tax) but 
no one can put that into practice.    
  
Another problem in excessive liberalization is that there will be numerous noise traders 
which often create noises (fluctuation in prices) for their own advantages. We discuss this 
issue in the following lines.  
Krugman have published a recent book on depression economics, the title of his recent 
book is: the return of depression economics[13]. A good chapter is devoted to history of 
America recession since 1907, exactly when knickerbocker trust collapse completely after 
failure to support numerous stock market trader, and they do not support anymore 
because of rush in their office that indicate that people lose their confidence in their 
scheme of investment (see page 156). And then you can compare that story of collapsing 
knickerbocker pseudobanking organization with Krugman’s explanation of logic behind 
America recession in 2008, exactly because a number of investment company do similar 
risky investment including in secondary mortgage, stock market and also foreign exchange 
market (page 190), and they are not properly regulated just like knickerbocker trust in 
1907, and that is indicating one hundred year cycle of crisis (1907-2007). And you should 
know that there are numerous pseudo-banking company in America who accept 
investment from their client (--exactly similar to what they call as ‘trust’ around one 
hundred year ago, see again page 156 of that book--), but they do not provide security nor 
they provide insurance if something happen to their client’s investment, and don’t you 
know that America always are reluctant to regulate those pseudo-banking system. 
That is a good article to ponder if you are really really really really really a good economist 
without a cruel cruel cruel cruel cruel heart, that is because you will find that volatility is 
17 
 
often caused by foreign exchange trader, which you can call as ‘noise trader.’ Don’t you 
know that noise trader is everywhere, but there is no regulation at all especially to foreign 
exchange trader, as explained by Krugman in page 190: 
 
‘there were some calls for long-term restrictions on international capital flows, not just 
temporary controls in times of crisis. For the most part of these calls were rejected in favor of a 
strategy of building up large foreign exchange reserve that were supposed to stave off future 
crises. Now it seems that this strategy didn’t work.’ [13] p.190 
 
And that is why: you should not believe to noise trader, and you should not lend your 
money to them too, because there is high likelihood that your investment money to them 
will disappear with probability chance more than 75%, just as what happen with ltcm. 
Don’t you know that noise trader is well defined by J.a. Frankel,[14] and noise traders can 
and are willing to create needless volatility and thereby force more risk-averse investors to 
stay away from marketplace. And that is the meaning of noise trader: they often create a 
number of gossip story in order a number of investment company collapse and then there 
will be huge market volatility. 
 
 
Concluding remarks  
One perhaps would think that a good idea to comprehend real situation behind economy of 
a given nation is to study the relation and interaction among the actors of such a clan 
capitalism. That is, to begin with network analysis instead of doing cumbersome 
mathematical analysis which mostly are based on unrealistic assumptions such as 
information symmetry, efficient market hypothesis, or the social utility of market exchange, 
or value of liberalization and privatization process. 
Based on Amartya Sen’s hypothesis, then one can extend further that hypothesize to 
become: (i) there is always tendency for clan groups to influence democracy system including 
news/media as the fourth pillar of democracy, in order to alter the course of distribution of 
resources for their advantage. 
Survey summary: while the number of respondents are very low compared to what we 
initially expect, one can draw a rough summary with respect to perception of Russia 
economy at present days. Out of five respondents, 80% of which are below 26 years old, 
there are 60% of them who perceive that Russia economy is in bad condition, and 
government in general do not do their best to take care all people. 40% of the respondents 
think that government doing badly to take care all people, and the other think that Russia 
government doing very badly. But as to the living condition in their town, the perception 
diverse widely, as shown that 60% think that living condition is bad or very bad, and only 
40% think that living condition in their town is good or very good.  
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And to the question concerning what Russia government have to do, two respondents write 
that corruption should be vanished. And to improve living condition in their town, they 
suggest to do more on traffic, social programs, and to keep the face of the city.       
We do not mention here other black market activities such as illegal import and export 
activities etc. which may or may not be related to clan group activities. Of course, if those 
activities in particular illegal importing or exporting of things related to drugs, then those 
activities are more likely related to clan groups. Limiting and decreasing plantation area of 
those plants which form as natural source of those illegal drugs can be effective (let say to 
decrease plantation area by 1-10 km2 per year), in this regards, but of course that would 
not be an easy task for law enforcement agencies in particular country, in particular 
because there are external market which include their own clans who are interested in 
those plants, and they already form connection with legal or illegal military forces (see 
diagram 5). That is why, one necessary step is to detach tentacles of those clans in 
government and military offices. 
Apparently, more study on the extent and role of such clan capitalism in a nation's 
economy and also their role in globalized economy can be expected in the coming years. 
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Appendix I response to a questionnaire 
In order to see whether the situation in Russia is getting better or not, a questionnaire have 
been sent to a number of people via online invitation, but alas there are only five 
respondents giving response to questionnaire sent to them (so far). Nonetheless this 
response can be considered as more or less reflecting frustrating situation experienced by 
common people. Respondents are Russian ordinary people or previously they stay in 
Russia, and the responses were given from last week in July 2010 until 5 Aug 2010.     
The small survey was carried out online with the help of online survey form: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/YBXNYJ8 
Survey summary: while the number of respondents are very low compared to what we 
initially expect, one can draw a rough summary with respect to perception of Russia 
economy at present days. Out of five respondents, 80% of which are below 26 years old, 
there are 60% of them who perceive that Russia economy is in bad condition, and 
government in general do not do their best to take care all people. 40% of the respondents 
think that government doing badly to take care all people, and the other think that Russia 
government doing very badly. But as to the living condition in their town, the perception 
diverse widely, as shown that 60% think that living condition is bad or very bad, and only 
40% think that living condition in their town is good or very good.  
And to the question concerning what Russia government have to do, two respondents write 
that corruption should be vanished. And to improve living condition in their town, they 
suggest to do more on traffic, social programs, and to keep the face of the city.       
We do not use advanced statistics here, we only present the commentaries and responses 
as is, and let the reader draw more insight from those answers. 
 
1. Question: What is your present occupation? 
a. College student. (20%) 
b. Teacher. (20%) 
c. Scientist 
d. Model 
e. Musician 
f. Other. (60%) 
 
2. Question: How old are you? 
a. Less than 20.  
b. 21 to 25. (80%) 
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c. 26 to 35. 
d. 36 to 45. 
e. Above 46. (20%) 
 
3. Question: Do you you think that overall economy of Russia is good  
in the past few years? Give rate from 1-4 scale.  (result is shown beside each choice) 
a. Rate 1 (very good).  
b. Rate 2 (good). 
c. Rate 3 (bad).  (60%) 
d. Rate 4 (very bad).  (20%) 
e. I do not know.  (20%) 
Explanation:  We have had no any economy - we just sale the gas only 
--- 
4. Question:  Do you think that government has done their best to take care all people? 
Give rate from 1-4 scale. 
a. Rate 1 (very good).  
b. Rate 2 (good). 
c. Rate 3 (bad).  (40%) 
d. Rate 4 (very bad).  (60%) 
e. I do not know. 
Explanation:  
They did nothing 
--- 
5. Question: Do you think that overall living condition in your town is better compared to 
ten years ago? Give rate from 1-4 scale.  
a. Rate 1 (very good).  (20%) 
b. Rate 2 (good).  (20%) 
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c. Rate 3 (bad).  (40%) 
d. Rate 4 (very bad).  (20%) 
e. I do not know. 
Explanation:  
prices grow up, but salary is the same 
--- 
6. Question: According to a number of study (see for example: Mancur Olson, Power and 
Prosperity),  the Russian economy is affected by crony capitalism or sometimes referred to 
as clan capitalism. 
a. I strongly agree. 
b. I agree. 
c. I disagree. (25%) 
d. I strongly disagree.  
e. I do not know. (75%) 
Answer:  
(i) Our economy depends of prices for oil only and of what kind of Putin`s friends are in 
Government. 
(ii) I am not familiar with the mentioned study and thus do not want to be too quick to 
either or agree or disagree with the statement. 
--- 
7. Question: How Russia's economy can be improved in your opinion?  
Describe what government can and should do to improve present economy.  
Please explain. 
Answer:  
(i) The economy depends of sort of government. If this government is really voted 
by people, they will put money from selling gas, oil in to development of science, 
into very poor social problems, into private industry to help them. But, alas ... 
(ii) corruption should be vanished 
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(iii) It is impossible to sum it up in a few words, really. 
(iv) They have to change their minds, i guess, cause all that they do is good only for 
someone's pocket, the first thing to do is to destroy corruption. 
 
--- 
8. Question: Do you have other suggestion to improve overall living condition in your 
town? 
Please explain. 
Answer:  
(i) In my town only? No, it depends of all country... The only I wish to our mayor is 
to safe, to keep the face of my town, of my very old and beautiful town, to not 
destroy it any more, for people could appreciate their history... And may be, it 
helps them to stay a good people. 
(ii) They need to do something about the traffic. 
(iii) In my opinion we need more social programs. 
(iv) No.  
 
9. Question: what is your hometown city? 
a. Moscow. (75%) 
b. St. Petersburg. 
c. Other. (25%)  
 
 
